A NEGLECTED QUA SOLUTION TO THE
FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM OF CHRISTOLOGY
Jc Beall and Jared Henderson

We advance a neglected QUA solution to the fundamental problem of
Christology. Our chief aim is to put the view on the theological table, leaving
future debate to tell its ultimate fate. After presenting the view we measure it
against standard problems that confront extant QUA views and also against
objections peculiar to the proposed view.

1. The Fundamental Problem of Christology
The fundamental problem of Christology concerns the coherence of orthodox Christology (at least as given by the Council of Chalcedon). In
particular, there is an apparent contradiction arising from Christ’s having
two apparently contrary natures—the divine and the human.1 Richard
Cross puts the problem crisply:
[T]he fundamental philosophical problem specific to the doctrine is this:
how is it that one and the same thing could be both divine (and thus, on the
face of it, necessary, and necessarily omniscient, omnipotent, eternal, immutable, impassible, and impeccable) and human (and thus, on the face of
it, have the complements of all these properties).2

In the same vein C. J. F. Williams writes:
The two assertions ‘Christ is a man’ and ‘Christ is God’ are prima facie opposed to one another. It seems impossible that they should both be true; and
this impossibility is apparently a logical impossibility. It is no use therefore
in discussing the Incarnation to appeal, as St Augustine did, to the Divine
Omnipotence; tota ratio facti est potentia facientis; for it is not part of the Christian faith that God can do the logically impossible.3

1
For present purposes we say that two natures (or, generally, properties) are contrary just
if a being’s having both of them entails a contradiction.
2
Cross, The Metaphysics of the Incarnation, 453.
3
Williams, “A Programme for Christology,” 515.
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An instance of the fundamental problem is the following argument
towards contradiction, where the rationales for the premises point to orthodox Christianity (at least per Chalcedon):4
1.

Christ is mutable.

2.

Christ is immutable.

3.

Therefore, Christ is mutable and not mutable.5

Many responses to this (and the other) arguments to contradiction are
available. Perhaps the most popular response is in the family of QUA responses, which, as Timothy Pawl notes, “are all attempts to modify the
statement so that the pairs are not apt [i.e., true] of the same thing at the
same time in the same way.”6
2. Three Standard QUA Solutions
There are three basic (families of) QUA solutions to the fundamental
problem, classified by the grammatical position of the (often hidden) QUA
locution in a sentence S is F.
1-QUA: S-QUA-N is F, where N is a nature. Here, the QUA device applies to the Subject position, where “QUA divine” and “QUA human”
each modifies the Subject (viz., Christ).
2-QUA: S is-QUA-N F, where N is a nature. Here, the QUA device applies to the Copula position, where “QUA divine” and “QUA human”
each modifies the Exemplification relation.
3-QUA: S is F-QUA-N, where N is a nature. Here, the QUA device applies to the Predicate position, where “QUA divine” and “QUA human”
each modifies the Property in question.
These QUA views are very well known in analytic theology and philosophical theology generally. We have little to add to either the standard
explanations of such views or standard objections against such views; we
rely on recent discussion for review and criticisms.7
4
Note that we treat “x is immutable” as entailing the (logical) negation of “mutable,”
namely, “x is not mutable” (or, equivalently, where it is false that is logical negation, “it is
false that x is mutable”). This, like so many elements of the problem, has been questioned, for
instance in Pawl, In Defense of Conciliar Christology; but that being immutable entails not being
mutable remains a common view—one that neither we nor the main QUA views question.
5
We put “Therefore” in (3) to mark the conclusion, but the content of (3) is simply “Christ
is mutable and not mutable.” We follow this convention throughout. We thank an anonymous referee for the suggestion.
6
Pawl, “A Solution to the Fundamental Problem of Christology,” 62.
7
We assume familiarity with the three standard QUA solutions. For recent discussion
that reflects our own understanding of (and positions on) the standard solutions see Adams,
“Christ as God-Man”; Cross, The Metaphysics of the Incarnation, chapter 8; Pawl, In Defense of
Conciliar Christology; and Senor, “Incarnation, Timelessness, and Leibniz’s Law Problems.”
We note that Pawl labels 1-QUA through 3-QUA as Subject, Copula and Predicate, respectively,
and even labels our target grammatical position (see § 3) as Assertion; but Pawl’s view of the
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3. A Fourth QUA Solution: 0-QUA
Our aim is to advance a novel QUA solution that, as far as we can tell,
has been completely neglected in analytic theology and philosophical theology generally. We do not advance or defend the given solution as the
true Christological theory. Rather, we put it forward as a solution that is
just as viable as other QUA solutions.
3.1 The Missing Position
The three standard QUA views concern sub-sentential parts of sentences:
Subject position, Copula, and Predicate. In the abstract this leaves at least
one more position that a QUA device might occupy: namely, applying to
the whole sentence—a sentential operator. In keeping with the i-QUA labels
above (see § 2) we call this fourth view 0-QUA:8
0-QUA: QUA-N: S is F. Here, the QUA device applies to the Sentence
(position), where “QUA divine” and “QUA human” each modifies the
Sentence—modifies the evaluation of the sentence.
But now the pressing question: how is “QUA divine” or “QUA human” to
be understood in such a way that it makes sense as a sentential operator?
3.2 Natures and Stories: According To
It is natural to think of Christ’s divine nature as delivering (i.e., entailing)
a true story of anything that exemplifies that nature, where “story,” in this
context, need not be fiction—and isn’t fiction in the case of the story of
Christ. Similarly, it is natural to think of Christ’s human nature as entailing
a true story of anything that exemplifies that nature. Indeed, any nature
delivers some true story of whatever possesses it—at the very least, the
essential truths tied to that nature.
We advance the 0-QUA view along just such lines: namely, the QUA
device is an according to Nature operator. In particular, Christ’s exemplification of two natures is accompanied by two distinct QUA devices:
According to the Divine Nature and According to the Human Nature. The more
standard (and perhaps more natural-to-the-ear) terminology of “story”
may equivalently be used provided that the core stories in question are
entailed by Christ’s two natures. Accordingly, one may think of the 0-QUA
account as involving two sentential operators: namely, According to the Divine Story and According to the Human Story.
3.3 The 0-QUA Solution
The 0-QUA solution to the fundamental problem notably varies from
Pawl’s characterization of QUA solutions in that it does not “[attempt]
latter is not what we have in mind at all (except grammatical position), and so we use our
own terminology.
8
For those to whose minds the familiar “in virtue of” idea springs we note that, while that
view can—and perhaps should—qualify as a 0-QUA view with respect to grammatical position,
we hope it is clear from the discussion below that such “in virtue of” ideas are not part of the
0-QUA view as we advance it. (See § 3.3 and especially § 4.1 for further discussion.)
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to modify the statement so that the pairs are not [true] of the same thing
at the same time in the same way.”9 Rather, the 0-QUA solution changes
how we evaluate the embedded (viz., “QUA-unadorned”) statements: according to our proposal we evaluate the target QUA-unadorned claims
relative to nature-tied stories. The 0-QUA view maintains that according
to the divine story Christ is not mutable, and that according to the human
story Christ is mutable. There are two natures and thereby two stories
of Christ; but it’s the one and only Christ in each of the two apparently
incompatible stories.
As with all QUA solutions the explicit statement of the relevant truths
requires the QUA device—in the 0-QUA view, the according to device. Any
truth in “Christ is mutable”—similarly, “Christ is immutable”—is elliptical
for an essentially QUA-involving claim (on our view, an according to device):
4.

According to the human story: Christ is mutable.

5.

According to the divine story: Christ is immutable (not mutable).

The central question: what of the alleged consequence (3)?
3.

Christ is mutable and not mutable.

On the 0-QUA view this step is fallacious since there is no one nature that
delivers a true story according to which Christ is mutable and not mutable. And that is critical. The two target stories (viz., divine and human)
are normally thought to be “unionizable” (for lack of a better term) into
one larger true story. But that this fails is precisely the lesson of the fundamental problem: namely, the true story of Christ is given not by the union
of all nature-tied stories of Christ but is rather a set of logically consistent
stories tied to Christ’s two (otherwise inconsistent) natures.
The uniqueness of Christ having two apparently contrary natures
without a logically contradictory theology is going to involve something
strange, a point on which all theologians and philosophers agree. On the
0-QUA view the strangeness is reflected in the fact that while both (4) and
(5) are true the union of the given nature-tied stories is untrue. Without
the explicit QUA operator the relevant truths of Christ are not expressed;
the according to operators are fundamental to telling the truth of Christ.
A dangerous analogy might be useful—dangerous if taken to be exactly
the 0-QUA view in Christology. Related phenomena have a similar (not to
say exactly the same) structure. Let “w” name a possible world in which
cats are enormous, each weighing 4000 lbs. Take all the claims that are true
of cats at w. That’s a true story in one clear sense: the claims in the story
are all true, according to w, of something. But any target truth expressed
by “all cats weigh 4000 lbs” is elliptical; it requires a 0-position operator,
namely, that according to the w story, cats are enormous.
9
Pawl, “A Solution to the Fundamental Problem of Christology,” 62. We do not believe
that Pawl would thereby withhold the 0-QUA view from the family of QUA views. What
Pawl’s characterization does is truly characterize the standard three QUA views—and we
agree with his characterization of those views.
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We are not suggesting that the fundamental problem of Christology—
Christ’s apparently contrary natures—is solved by thinking that the
natures are divided up into island-like possible worlds. (That’s the danger
in the dangerous analogy.) But the loose analogy can be useful (if the
danger is avoided). Natures can be thought of as delivering—entailing—
true stories of whatever exemplifies that nature. Normally—in fact, in all
but the extraordinary case of Christ—we don’t bother invoking the explicit According to operator; normally there’s exactly one nature at issue,
and nothing perplexing arises. But Christ’s particular two-natured being
cries out for explicitly using the According to operator. That’s what the
fundamental problem of Christology teaches us according to the 0-QUA
account. The truth of Christ is QUA-adorned at a fundamental level.
4. Measured against Objections
The 0-QUA view is simple and, by our lights, at least as plausible as the
other three QUA views. We now clarify the view by defending it against
some objections.
4.1 A Non-starter?
Objection: The proposed 0-QUA view is neither new nor viable. There is a
0-QUA view that is well known and rightfully widely dismissed, namely,
where the 0-position device is an in-virtue-of-Nature operator. Timothy
Pawl calls such a view a non-starter because it “doesn’t provide a way to
avoid predicating ‘passible’ and ‘impassible’ to the same thing.”10
Similarly, voicing the widespread non-starter view, Senor writes:11
The first and most straightforward reading is “In virtue of being N, S is F.”
Thus, understood this way, if one says “Qua God, Jesus Christ was omnipotent”, one is saying that it is in virtue of his deity (or his divine nature) that
Christ was omnipotent. . . . The difficulty with this interpretation of qua-sentences . . . is that it does not solve [the fundamental problem].12

What Pawl and Senor (and others) are highlighting is that in virtue of devices satisfy the following (extra-logical) entailment, “release”:13
6.

In virtue of N: S is F.

7.

Therefore, S is F.

And if this is the case the fundamental problem reappears.

Pawl, “Conciliar Christology and the Problem of Incompatible Predications,” 97.
See also Pawl’s further argument along these lines in Pawl, “Conciliar Christology and
the Problem of Incompatible Predicates,” 93–94, along with discussions in Adams, “Christ as
God-Man,” 254–255 and Cross, The Metaphysics of the Incarnation, 194.
12
Senor, “Incarnation, Timeless, and Leibniz’s Law Problems,” 229.
13
This is not a logical entailment because logic only speaks of logical vocabulary, and “in
virtue of” is not part of logical vocabulary; however, the entailment would be one of an
extra-logical consequence relation for theories (perhaps including theology) that involve the
target in virtue of language.
10
11
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Reply: We agree with Pawl and Senor (as well as Adams and Cross)
about the given entailments of relevant in virtue of devices. But our 0-QUA
proposal is not an in-virtue-of proposal at all. We have offered a different
account of (0-position) QUA clauses, where they are according to operators.
According to operators do not support the problematic release entailment:
8.

According to N: S is F.

9.

Therefore, S is F.

This step is dubious right from the start. Our proposed 0-QUA position
blocks this entailment, an entailment without which the target logical
contradiction—the fundamental-problem contradiction—fails to arise.
(See § 4.3 for more on inferential behavior of according to.) Accordingly, the
0-QUA solution, unlike the in-virtue-of-N accounts, offers a solution to the
fundamental problem of Christology.
Not only do we agree with Pawl’s claim, and similar claims made by
others, that the in-virtue-of approach to a (0-position) QUA view is a nonstarter; we think that it can be strengthened. On our view the in-virtue-of
approach offers not a solution to the target contradiction; it offers would-be
explanations for the independent contradictory claims. Why is Christ mutable? What explains Christ’s mutability? Answer: Christ’s mutability is
explained by his human nature; it’s in virtue of Christ’s human nature that
Christ is mutable. Why is Christ immutable? What explains the immutability? Answer: Christ’s immutability is explained by his divine nature; it’s
in virtue of the divine nature that Christ is immutable. What “in virtue of’”
is doing is offering an explanation of how we get to the apparent contradiction, not a resolution of the contradiction—which is why Pawl and many
others are exactly right that it is a non-starter as a solution to the fundamental problem. It’s a non-starter to that problem because it stops at the
starting line of the problem. In many ways the in-virtue-of 0-position “QUA
view” is not really a QUA view at all; it doesn’t—as far as we can see—purport to modify or operate on the embedded statement so much as explain it.
Like the other standard three QUA views our proposed 0-QUA view involves a rejection of the would-be stand-alone truth that Christ is mutable
(similarly, immutable); the truth is expressed only in QUA-modified form,
where, on our view, the QUA device is one or another according to operator
(namely, According to the divine story or According to the human story). Moreover, unlike the would-be in-virtue-of “QUA view,” our proposed 0-QUA
view, just like the other three standard QUA views, does not purport to
explain either the would-be stand-alone truth that Christ is mutable or the
would-be stand-alone truth that Christ is immutable; it offers no explanation of those would-be stand-alone facts because they aren’t (stand-alone)
facts. The Christological truths are the QUA-adorned ones that explicitly
advert to the nature-driven stories.14
14
An anonymous referee points out that a possible QUA view could hold that some
nature-tied stories release: the divine story could release and so “Christ is immutable” (un-
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4.2 Unadorned Truths
Objection: The reply to the “non-starter” objection (see § 4.1) suggests
that no truths are true of Christ except ones that are QUA-adorned (i.e.,
0-QUA-prefixed). Is that the position?
Reply: The whole point of QUA views is that the fundamental problem
of Christology arises from ignoring QUA devices—ignoring, so to speak,
“QUA-lifications” implicit in the target truths. The 0-QUA account is no
different. Again, any truth expressed by the QUA-unadorned “Christ is
immutable” is elliptical for the explicitly adorned “According to the Divine Story: Christ is immutable.” Moreover, as we have emphasized, there
is no “unionizing” of the Divine and Human stories into a single, standalone QUA-free true story. But this is not to say that no QUA-free truths
are consequences of the QUA-adorned truths. The following principle can
be incorporated into the true Christology without problem:
Nature Release: If both According to the Human Story: P and According to
the Divine Story: P are true, then P itself is true.
The idea is that the QUA-unadorned sentences that are included in our
total true theory of Christ are just those that are delivered by each of
Christ’s nature-tied stories.
Here again the extraordinary case of Christ is made apparent. Typically, each person has a single nature—and so has a single true story. The
single-natured case always satisfies a generalized version of Nature Release.15 Since P is true in every nature-tied story—in the usual case, the
only nature-tied story—P is true even without a 0-QUA adornment. But
Christ is fundamentally different from most persons; Christ has two very
different natures and two very different nature-tied stories.
4.3 Unadorned Un-truths
Objection: The proposed 0-QUA account rejects that “Christ is immutable”
is true (likewise for “mutable,” and so on). But, then, the 0-QUA view
must hold that “Christ is immutable” is false. But, then, the 0-QUA account is just heresy; it accepts the falsity of Christ’s immutability. And so
the proposed 0-QUA view fails to achieve a key desideratum: namely, to
provide an orthodox Christology—a solution to the fundamental problem
which is compatible with orthodox Christology.
Reply: We think that orthodox Christology demands that according to
the divine story Christ is immutable; and the proposed 0-QUA view fundamentally accepts that truth. On no QUA view does orthodoxy demand
adorned) would be true while the human story would not release and so “Christ is mutable”
would only be true when understood as QUA-adorned. This would avoid the inconsistency,
but we see no principled reason why some stories should release while others do not.
15
Here is the generalized version of the principle, which we also endorse.
General Nature Release: Let N be a nature and x an individual. Let P be any statement. Suppose that for every nature N that x has, it’s true that according to N: P.
Then P itself is true.
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the truth of the QUA-unadorned sentence “Christ is immutable,” and to
demand as much would border on question begging against QUA views.
The only solutions that maintain the truth of the target QUA-unadorned
claims are either contradictory16 or offer non-standard truth (falsity) conditions for the given claims.17 Our concern in this paper is squarely on
QUA views—and the neglected 0-QUA view in particular—and not on
alternative approaches.
The current objection does raise a very important question: Is the
QUA-unadorned claim “Christ is immutable” false since untrue? The question demands a more explicit statement of what “truth” (similarly, “falsity”)
amounts to in the 0-QUA account. Much of the answer is implicit in what
we have said so far but the current objection invites an explicit statement.
4.3.1 0-QUA and truth-in-N. The fundamental problem of Christology
arises from ignoring (implicit) 0-QUA devices. On the 0-QUA view the
key devices are according to operators, each tied to a particular nature (viz.,
according to human nature, according to divine nature). Like according to
operators in general, the key Christological devices do not release—that
is, P is not entailed by the truth that (for example) According to the divine
story: P. The key unadorned claims in the fundamental problem (e.g.,
“Christ is immutable,” etc.) are true in some but not all relevant stories;
and the idea of being true-in-N (for nature-tied story N) is a key notion in
the 0-QUA account.18
4.3.2 Stories as (modeled by) closed sets of sentences. For simplicity we
shall think of stories as (modeled by) sets of sentences, and in particular
so-called closed sets of sentences. Here, the “closure relation” is whatever entailment relation is required by the true Christology. For present
purposes we shall greatly simplify by thinking of the given relation as
all-possible-worlds entailment. Accordingly, a story is a set of sentences
closed under all-possible-worlds entailment: if P is in the story and P
all-possible-worlds entails Q, then Q too is in the story. (This is all that is
meant by “closed under” for present purposes.)
4.3.3 Truth-in-N and falsity-in-N. Just as in logical studies, where the
notion of truth-in-a-model (similarly, falsity-in-a-model) is the key notion
of “truth” (similarly, of “falsity”), so too the idea of truth (falsity) in a story
is key to the 0-QUA account in Christology. And here the definition is
completely standard:
Definition 1 (Truth-In-Story-N): Let N be a story. We say that P is truein-N (or “true in the story N”) iff P is in N.
Hence, to say that “Christ is mutable” is true-in-the-human-story is to say
(something modeled by the claim) that “Christ is mutable” is in the target
Beall, “Christ—A Contradiction.”
Pawl, In Defense of Conciliar Christology.
18
For simplicity we sometimes use “N” ambiguously over natures and the corresponding
nature-tied stories, leaving context to clarify.
16
17
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story (where, again, stories are modeled by sets of sentences closed under
a given entailment relation). Likewise, mutatis mutandis, for other claims
involved in the fundamental problem of Christology.
Similarly, we invoke a standard definition of falsity in a story, where it is
false that is logical negation:
Definition 2 (Falsity-In-Story-N): Let N be a story. We say that P is falsein-N (or “false in the story N”) iff the (logical) negation of P is in N.
Hence, to say that “Christ is mutable” is false-in-the-divine-story is to say
(something modeled by the claim) that “It is false that Christ is mutable”
is in the target story (or where “not” is logical negation, “Christ is not mutable” is in the target story). Likewise, mutatis mutandis, for other claims
involved in the fundamental problem of Christology.
4.3.4 Truth as truth-in-all and Falsity as falsity-in-all. § 4.3.3 makes explicit
the fundamental notions of truth-in-N and falsity-in-N. What of the target
notions of Truth (simpliciter) and Falsity (simpliciter)? Here, we also
follow a standard idea due to Bas van Fraassen.19
Definition 3 (Truth (Simpliciter)): Let P be any statement. Then P is True
(simpliciter) iff P is true-in-N for all relevant stories N.
Hence, to say that “Christ is mutable” is True is to say that “Christ is mutable” is true-in-N for all relevant stories N, including the divine story. On
the 0-QUA view, that “Christ is mutable” is True should be rejected, as
“Christ is mutable” is not true in the divine story.
Similarly, we invoke the corresponding false-in-all account of Falsity:
Definition 4 (Falsity (Simpliciter)): Let P be any statement. Then P is
False (simpliciter) iff P is false-in-N for all relevant stories N.
Hence, to say that “Christ is mutable” is False is to say that “Christ is
mutable” is false-in-N for all relevant stories N, including the human story.
On the 0-QUA view, that “Christ is mutable” is False should be rejected, as
it is not false-in-the-human-story.
4.3.5 Unadorned sentences: recap. Note that we now have a sample
QUA-unadorned sentence that, according to the 0-QUA account, is neither True nor False, namely, “Christ is mutable.” Yes, “Christ is mutable”
is true according to the human story, but it is not True. And, yes, “Christ
is mutable” is false according to the divine story, but it is not False. In
this sense (and in this sense only) one should accept neither “Christ is
mutable” nor its logical negation expressed via “Christ is immutable” (i.e.,
not mutable).
19
van Fraassen, “Singular Terms, Truth-Value Gaps, and Free Logic.” We use uppercase
“T” in “Truth” (similarly, “Falsity”) to flag the technical usage. We note that this usage, important for the true Christology (according to the proposed 0-QUA view), is compatible with
some very general notion of truth which is completely independent from truth-in-N relations, etc. (Analogy: the many important notions of truth-in-a-model that are used in many
important theories do not in any way threaten a general notion of truth which is independent
from such notions.)
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We say that all QUA views should unite in a rejection of both “Christ is
mutable” and “Christ is immutable” (QUA-unadorned just so), but in no
way is such a rejection—as we see it—a rejection of orthodox Christology.
Christology—the true Christology—is one whose nature-tied claims are
explicitly or implicitly adorned; and it is with such adornment that the
truths about Christ’s uniqueness may be expressed.20
4.4 Law of Excluded Middle
Objection: The 0-QUA view should be rejected since it needs to reject an
important metaphysical principle for properties. Given the definitions of
Truth and Falsity in § 4.3.4 the 0-QUA view is incompatible with the following excluded-middle principle:
Law of Excluded Middle for Properties (LEMP): For any object a, and any
property F, either it is true that a is F or it is true that a is not F.
The 0-QUA view rejects such a principle inasmuch as it requires that for
some QUA-unadorned sentence neither the sentence nor its negation is
True. (Example: “Christ is mutable,” “Christ is not mutable.”) And this
violates LEMP, which is both an important metaphysical (and, in turn,
theological) principle and also an independently plausible principle.21
Reply: The objection is important but is not as severe as it seems.
According to 0-QUA, “Christ is mutable” is not True and “Christ is not mutable” is not True; however, according to 0-QUA “Either Christ is mutable
or Christ is not mutable” is True. To see this, recall that target stories in the
0-QUA account are modeled by closed sets of sentences, with the target
closure relation defined as all-possible-worlds-entailment. Accordingly,
each story contains all necessary truths (and thereby all logical truths).
We grant (for this discussion) that “A or not-A” is one such (schematic)
necessary truth. Hence, since all necessary truths are in each target story,
each target story contains each instance of the given (excluded-middle)
schema; and so each story contains “Christ is mutable or Christ is not mutable,” and so—by definition of Truth—the given sentence (i.e., the given
instance of the given excluded-middle principle) is True.
The objection, we say, does not point to a problem with the 0-QUA view.
On the other hand, the objection is important in highlighting what might
appear (to some) to be strange. One might think that if “Christ is mutable
or Christ is not mutable” is True, then either “Christ is mutable” is True or
“Christ is not mutable” is True. The 0-QUA account, for fairly straightforward reasons, rejects such a principle (viz., a principle according to which
a disjunction is True only if at least one disjunct is True). As in § 4.3.4, the
0-QUA account takes inspiration from supervaluationist treatments of various predicates, wherein Truth is defined as truth-in-all-valuations (or, in
20
We note that the explicit model of Truth (etc.) just given sits naturally with the Nature
Release principle(s) in § 4.2.
21
We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pressing this objection.
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0-QUA terms, truth-in-all-stories).22 On a supervaluationist treatment of a
particular predicate F, a sentence “a is F” can fail to be True and fail to be
False when “a is F” is true according to one valuation but is untrue according to
another. Similarly, “a is not F” will fail to be True and fail to be False when
“a is not F” is true in one valuation and untrue in another. But since valuations, like the stories in the 0-QUA account, are (usually) closed under
all-possible-worlds-entailment (or, in the formal development, closed at
least under classical logic), then “Either a is F or a is not F” is true in all
such valuations and hence, by definition, True. Accordingly, on the issue of
excluded-middle principles, the 0-QUA account is no more nor less strange
than any usual supervaluationist treatment of (some class of) predicates.
4.5 Humanity, Divinity
Objection: The 0-QUA account is just heresy. A desideratum is to maintain orthodoxy in a solution to the fundamental problem. The “solution”
points out that the truth of orthodox Christology is not given in the
QUA-unadorned claims
1.

Christ is mutable.

2.

Christ is immutable.

but rather in the explicitly adorned nature-tied claims:
4.

According to the human story: Christ is mutable.

5.

According to the divine story: Christ is immutable.

This is all in keeping with the standard core of QUA views: namely, resolve
the apparent contradiction of Christ’s two (apparently contrary) natures by
rejecting the QUA-unadorned claims while accepting the genuine QUAadorned truths. But the 0-QUA view is downright heretical. In particular,
the 0-QUA view must reject the very divinity and the very humanity of
Christ. Specifically, the 0-QUA account must reject the orthodox truths:
10. Christ is human (i.e., exemplifies the human nature).
11. Christ is divine (i.e., exemplifies the divine nature).
That the 0-QUA account must reject both of these orthodox claims is clear.
On the 0-QUA account natures entail true stories, at the very least true
stories of anything that has the given nature. Moreover, on the 0-QUA
account the divine nature entails immutability while the human nature
entails mutability. Accordingly, if “Christ is divine” is true then “Christ
is immutable” is true: (11) entails (2)—and likewise for other entailments.
Hence, if (11) is in the true Christology then (2) is too. But on the 0-QUA
account (2) is not in the true Christology.
The upshot: the 0-QUA account not only fails to be compatible with
orthodoxy; it is clearly heretical in its rejection of both the divinity and
humanity of Christ.
22
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Reply: Contrary to the objection, what orthodoxy demands is that
according to the divine story Christ is divine, and that according to the
human story Christ is human. To demand more is to border on begging
the question against all QUA views, not just 0-QUA. After all, no QUA
view can accept that “Christ is divine,” QUA-unadorned just so, is true
without rejecting the entailment from it to, for example, the QUA-unadorned “Christ is immutable.” And while, at least in principle, any QUA
view can reject the given entailment from the divine nature to the given
nature-tied properties involved in the fundamental problem, doing so
would (in practice) diminish the importance of QUA adornments. Either
way, QUA views generally should treat the orthodox claim about Christ’s
divinity—likewise, humanity—exactly as they treat the other target orthodox claims (e.g., “Christ is immutable,” “Christ is mutable,” etc.):
namely, such central truths are themselves QUA-adorned.23
4.6 Multiplying Persons
Objection: An objection to 1-QUA is that it multiplies the persons of Christ.
Any orthodox Christological theory rejects that Christ is two different
persons—the divine Christ and the human Christ—and instead maintains
that Christ is exactly one person who is both (“fully”) divine in nature and
(“fully”) human in nature. Leo the Great writes that:
[One] and the same mediator between God and humanity, the man Christ Jesus, could both on the one hand die and on the other be incapable of death.24

The important point is that any orthodox Christology must say of the same
person (viz., Christ) that he is both immutable and mutable. But the 0-QUA
proposal looks to confront the same problem: it maintains that there are
two different (and, indeed, apparently incompatible) stories of Christ, and
thereby appears to multiply persons—the subjects of the apparently incompatible stories.
Reply: Our 0-QUA account does say of Christ that according to one
story he is immutable and, according to the other, he is mutable; it says
this of one person, not two. Christ—the one and only person at issue—is
the subject of both target stories. That they cannot be consistently unionized is a mark of Christ’s strange (and unique) role and being.
Indeed, this may be the mark at which orthodoxy points to the ineffability
of the hypostatic union of the two apparently contrary natures. It is a part
of orthodox Christology that the hypostatic union is a mystery; thus, any
good model of Christ’s exemplification of the natures can only be illuminating up to a point. (If a model is so illuminating that the hypostatic union
23
An anonymous referee raises the point that some QUA views may not require that
“Christ is divine” and “Christ is human” are QUA-adorned, provided that on such a view
“Christ is divine” (unadorned) does not entail, e.g., “Christ immutable” (unadorned) but
rather the related QUA-adorned claim. On these views, the relevant entailments are QUAadorned, thus avoiding the fundamental problem. This would be one way to develop a QUA
account, though we know of no one who explicitly puts forward such a solution.
24
Tanner, Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, 78.
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ceases to be a mystery, it fails to be a good model.) Our 0-QUA account
shows that the hypostatic union does not lead to contradiction; however,
the account leaves mysterious just how the hypostatic union happens.
4.7 Accidental Properties
Objection: What about accidental properties? On the 0-QUA view the essential properties of a given nature are in that nature-tied story. But are the
accidental properties in any of the nature-tied stories?
Reply: The proposed view is silent on whether accidental properties are
to be included in nature-tied stories. As in § 3.2, the nature-tied stories, at a
minimum, include the essential properties of their respective natures; but,
for all that we’ve said, the nature-tied stories might include more.
Distinguish two versions of 0-QUA: namely, “permissive” and “strict.”
A strict 0-QUA view holds that only the essential, nature-tied properties
are in the nature-tied story. A permissive 0-QUA view holds that every relevant story includes its nature-tied properties as well as all the relevant
accidental properties.
For present purposes, we remain neutral between strict and permissive
variants of 0-QUA, leaving debate over theological-cum-philosophical
merits of the two views to future work.25 What’s important, for present
purposes, is that such neutrality does not compromise the account’s viability as a solution to the fundamental problem. The fundamental problem is
a problem about Christ’s essential properties: there is an apparent contradiction in Christ’s having two (apparently contrary) natures, giving rise
to apparently logically contradictory properties. But on either version of
the 0-QUA account (viz., strict, permissive) no single nature delivers a
story wherein Christ has incompatible properties, regardless of whether
Christ’s accidental properties are included in the story.
4.8 Non-adjunctive Consequence
Objection: The 0-QUA view, as advanced, involves the idea that Christ’s
nature-tied stories cannot be unionized to form a stand-alone true story
free of QUA-adorned claims. This avoids the fundamental contradiction at
the price of keeping the full story of Christ separated into nature-tied stories. A more natural approach would be to have a single (true) story where
the fundamental contradiction—for example, the conjunction of “Christ is
mutable” and its logical negation—does not arise even though each of the
conjuncts is true in the story. This would involve a so-called non-adjunctive
consequence relation for the true Christology, one where logical conjunction
differs from the standard account by failing to be entailed by the given conjuncts. (In other words, if ∧ is logical conjunction, then the non-adjunctive
approach to consequence rejects that P ∧ Q is logically entailed by a story/
25
An anonymous referee raises the point that if some of Christ’s accidental properties are
contrary to some of Christ’s nature-specific essential properties, then this is a reason to adopt
the strict 0-QUA view. We accept the conditional but remain neutral about which variant of
the 0-QUA view to adopt.
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theory that contains both P and Q.) This approach avoids the fundamental
contradiction at the heart of the fundamental problem of Christology, and
even does so without any need for QUA decorations.26
Reply: We agree that theology might demand a non-standard account
of logical vocabulary (though on the proposed 0-QUA view logical vocabulary remains standard);27 and it might well be that logical conjunction is
the best candidate for a non-standard account. We also agree that non-adjunctive consequence (entailment) relations are widely available and well
understood in logical studies.28 What we reject is that the non-adjunctive
route resolves the fundamental problem. Yes, the step from (1) and (2)
to (3) in the target fundamental problem (see § 1) is logically invalid according to the non-adjunctive account; but the spirit of the fundamental
problem remains strong. In particular, the alleged virtue of having a single,
stand-alone QUA-free (true) story of Christ is diminished by the fact that
we have a logically contradictory story despite losing the fundamental
contradiction. To be clear: define a contradiction to be the (logical) conjunction of a sentence and its (logical) negation. Define a contradictory story
(or theory) to be a negation-inconsistent story (where negation is logical
negation), that is, a story that contains both a sentence and its (logical) negation, regardless of whether it contains the corresponding contradiction
(viz., the logical conjunction of the given sentence and its logical negation).
Then the alleged virtue of the non-adjunctive approach is that we have a
stand-alone QUA-unadorned story of Christ that contains no contradiction—a fortiori, no fundamental contradiction. But how is this a solution
to the fundamental problem if the given stand-alone story is nonetheless
contradictory? We see no clear answer, and so reject the non-adjunctive
approach.29
4.9 Ad Hoc and Irrelevant
Objection: Even if 0-QUA solves the fundamental problem of Christology,
in that it avoids the apparent contradiction of orthodox Christology, it is
suspiciously ad hoc, and it looks like 0-QUA will have few (if any) applications in other areas of Christology or theology.
Reply: Our focus is on the fundamental problem of Christology, and
so we make no argument that 0-QUA solves other theological problems.
But there is precedent for thinking that QUA adornments are needed in
We thank Susana Gómez for raising this point.
Strictly speaking, issues arise if one generalizes logical entailment to so-called multiple
conclusion entailment, at which point the peculiarity of a non-adjunctive account of conjunction is mirrored in some ways by the supervaluational (and so-called non-prime) features of
True disjunctions (where Truth is defined per 0-QUA). But we flag this technicality only for
those readers who balk at our claim that the 0-QUA account keeps to the standard account
of logical entailment. (We say it does, provided that logical entailment is a single-conclusion
relation, which we take it to be qua one of various closure relations.)
28
Jaskowski, “Propositional Calculus for Contradictory Deductive Systems.”
29
We should emphasize that if one were to pursue a genuinely logically contradictory
Christology then there is no obvious need for the proposed non-adjunctive approach, since
26
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other areas of theology, or at least in other areas of Christology. Consider
the relation of the Son to the Father in the Godhead. Aquinas writes that:
We are to understand that Christ is subject to the Father not simply but in his
human nature even if this qualification be not added; and yet it is better to
add this qualification in order to avoid the error of Arius, who held the Son
to be less than the Father.30

And here we can understand Aquinas as endorsing a view like 0-QUA: it is
true according to the human story that Christ is subject to the Father, but it
is not true according to the divine story.31 And understanding it to be true
(unadorned) that Christ is subject to the Father will, according to Aquinas,
lead to the problems of Arianism. So, Aquinas recommends that in our
Christological theorizing we ought to understand “Christ is subject to the
Father” as QUA-adorned even if this adornment is not made explicit.32
Figuring out which claims about Christ require adornment is not an easy
task. But this is par for the course in theory building: building theories of
anything is difficult, and building theories of Christ, who is extraordinary
in having two (apparently contrary) natures, even more so. Beyond being
difficult the task is important: as Aquinas notes, figuring out which claims
require QUA adornment can prevent errors such as Arius’s.
5. Closing Remarks
Our aim has not been to establish that 0-QUA is the best of the QUA
solutions; our aim has been to advance 0-QUA as a genuine option to the
standard families. We have argued that the 0-QUA solution to the fundamental problem of Christology has many virtues: it provides a natural gloss
of QUA clauses as according to clauses; it requires no sub-sentential modifications of sentences in our Christological theory; and it can overcome all
of the objections leveled against other QUA accounts. We believe that the
0-QUA account is at least as plausible as the standard three QUA views,
and may ultimately be the best QUA approach. Future debate will tell.33
University of Connecticut

the point of a contradictory Christology is to accept that the fundamental “problem” of
Christology is not in fact a logical problem at all. But in our current discussion we are setting
aside the option of a logically contradictory Christology; our focus is on the QUA families
that purport to resolve the fundamental problem in a logically non-contradictory fashion.
30
Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, III, q.20, a.11.
31
See also Crisp, The Word Enfleshed, 6, where the subordination of the Son it taken to be
the doctrine that Christ is subordinate to the Father (i) in his human nature, and (ii) during
his state of humiliation. We do not mean to endorse Crisp’s particular theory—on which
we remain neutral here—but we see Crisp as proposing something in the spirit of a 0-QUA
view in another area of Christology, namely, in the relationship of the Son to the Father in
the Godhead.
32
Aquinas also makes this point in Summa Theologiae III, q.16, a.8.
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